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dough stage. After ensiling, si-
lage cut at more mature stages 
contained more true protein than 
silage cut at immature stages. 
The protein of silage made from 
oats cut in the boot and heading 
stages deteriorated in the silo. 
The protein degraded and formed 
ammonia and other undesirable 
nitrogen compounds which con-
tributed to an objectionable odor 
of the silage. With the silage 
made from oats cut at the dough 
stage, however, a more desirable 
fermentation resulted in forma-
tion of lactic acid which helped 
preserve the silage. Also, not as 
much protein changed to am-
monia, and this silage had a good 
aroma. 
Which Did Cows Like? 
Our clipping experiments and 
chemical analyses suggested that 
TO HELP relieve long-standing farm price and income prob-
lems, the possibilities of farm 
producers acting jointly to man-
age their output and marketings 
are attracting increased interest. 
Some of the thinking is this: If 
all producers- or large groups of 
them acting together- could con-
trol the amount and quality of a 
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the dough stage was optimum for 
making oats into silage. But we 
weren't sure that cows would 
"agree." To find out, we con-
ducted a feeding test with dairy 
cows to study their acceptance of 
silage made from oats cut at vari-
ous stages. 
Silage made from oats cut at 
each of the five stages was placed 
in adjacent feed bunks and of-
fered to the cows free choice. 
Within a few minutes, they had 
rejected the silage made from oats 
cut at the immature stages and 
had gathered around the bunks of 
silage made from oats cut in the 
early and late dough stages and 
ate all of it. After 12 hours a 
good share of the silage made 
from immature oats remained in 
the bunks. Apparently, the pres-
ence of ammonia and other objec-
tionable compounds, such as bu-
tyric acid, in the early-cut silages 
made them unpalatable to the 
dairy cows. 
A preliminary test indicated 
that cows gave more milk when 
fed silage made from oats cut at 
the mid-dough stage than did 
cows fed silage made from oats 
harvested at heading. 
In Summary ..• 
Our tests indicate that the 
dough stage is the best time to 
harvest oats for silage for these 
reasons: 
1. Yield is greater. 
2. Moisture percentage is at 
the optimum of 60-70 percent. 
3. Aroma and preservation of 
the silage is better. 
4. Dairy cows prefer silage 
made from oats harvested in the 
dough stage and apparently give 
more milk from it. 
Farm Co-ops: How 
''Special''a Status? 
How far may farm co-ops go to gain more market power? Are they, as some 
believe, totally exempt from antitrust prosecution? Apparently not, and 
court decisions are beginning to outline the boundaries for co-op action. 
by L. B. Fletcher 
product going to market, perhaps 
they could bargain for more fa-
vorable prices or incomes. 
Marketing cooperatives often 
are suggested as devices for wield-
ing market power for farmers. 
One reason is that many market-
ing co-ops already exist and rep-
resent groups of farmers acting in 
unison to improve their economic 
position. Another reason given is 
that they have a "special" status 
under antitrust laws. What about 
those reasons? 
The first reason is sound. The 
second needs a caution sign. Leg-
islative measures have led some 
people to assume that farm coop-
eratives are completely exempt 
from prosecution for antitrust vio-
lations. This, however, isn't so. 
Court decisions haven't yet 
marked all of the boundaries for 
cooperatives under antitrust leg-
islation. But the emerging pattern 
of decisions is showing that legis-
lation has given co-ops only a 
limited exemption from antitrust 
actions. 
Thus, let's look at the back-
ground leading to co-ops' " spe-
cial" status, some pertinent court 
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decisions and what exemptions 
apply today. 
Co-ops Are Growing ... 
Agricultural marketing cooper-
atives have developed in the 
United States largely since 1900. 
Then, they were of minor impor-
tance in the market. Today, there 
are more than 6,100 marketing 
associations; total membership 
exceeds 3.8 million. The gross 
business of marketing co-ops has 
grown from about 304 million dol-
lars in 1913 until it now exceeds 
10 billion dollars a year. 
Between one-fifth and one-
fourth of all farm products sold 
in 1954 were handled by cooper-
atives at one or more stages in the 
marketing channels. Co-ops han-
dle substantial percentages of the 
total output of some commodities. 
For example, co-op elevators move 
at least a third of all cash grain; 
co-op plants manufacture close to 
45 percent of all butter produced; 
co-ops process nearly three-
fourths of the cranberries and 
one-third of the citrus products. 
Historically, co-ops have had 
more effect in balancing market 
prices under unrestricted produc-
tion than in raising prices by re-
stricting output or by price-fixing 
agreements. In the past, entry of 
cooperatives into markets often 
has increased competition. 
Modern marketing associations, 
however, may sufficiently influ-
ence the markets in which they 
operate to affect the prices their 
members receive. Some associa-
tions have obtained larger total re-
turns for annual crop production 
by withholding or diverting cer-
tain products from the market. 
Such products include fluid milk, 
lemons, oranges, almonds, ava-
cados, walnuts and cranberries. 
This brings us to the question 
of how co-ops received whatever 
antitrust exemption they have. 
How " Exempt"? 
The Sherman Act of 1890 first 
expressed the policy that antitrust 
legislation was meant to promote 
free competition in open markets. 
Later, doubt arose as to the status 
of cooperatives under the act. 
Farm groups feared that the law 
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might be interpreted so that pro-
ducers organized into marketing 
co-ops could be held in violation 
as combinations in restraint of 
trade. 
The Clayton Act attempted to 
resolve this fear in 1914 by ex-
empting nonprofit, nonstock farm-
er cooperatives from prosecution 
under the Sherman Act. In 192 2 
the Capper-Volstead Act extend-
ed the exemption to co-ops with 
capital stock. Agricultural pro-
ducers were authorized to act to-
gether to process, prepare for 
market, handle and market their 
pro duct s. Necessary con tracts 
and agreements to carry out those 
activities were legalized for asso-
ciations which either restrict each 
member to one vote or limit divi-
dends to 8 percent. 
In addition to these basic legis-
lative provisions, the Cooperative 
Marketing Act of 192 6 provided 
that agricultural producers and 
their associations may legally ac-
quire and exchange "past, present 
and prospective" production, mar-
keting and price data. Finally, 
the Robinson-Patman Act legal-
ized patronage dividends to mem-
bers in proportion to their sales 
through an association. 
Judicial interpretations haven't 
marked all boundaries of coopera-
tives under antitrust legislation. 
But some cases have set up prec-
edents indicating the circum-
stances under which co-ops are 
and are not exempt. 
When "Exempt": The courts 
recognized that many widely 
spread producers of a product 
may need some type of centrally 
controlled national cooperative or 
federation of local organizations 
for effective marketing. So, ad-
ministrative ruling has placed cen-
trally controlled co-ops, federated 
co-ops and the use of joint mar-
keting agencies within the author-
ization of the Capper-Volstead 
Act, though they weren't express-
ly included in the statute. 
This ruling was upheld in 19 5 6 
when a district court acquitted 
two co-ops charged with unlawful 
combination and conspiracy to fix 
prices in violation of the Sherman 
Act. The court interpreted the 
Clayton Act as applicable to pro-
ducers whether they joined into a 
single co-op or into several asso-
ciations acting jointly. 
When Not "Exempt": One way 
that an organization which con-
trols the disposition of a commod-
ity can increase its total revenue 
is to sell to some buyers at higher 
prices than others. But, general-
ly the Robinson-Patman Act pro-
hibits discriminatory prices. Co-
operatives are subject to these 
prohibitions with the exception of 
the approval for payment of pat-
ronage dividends and discrimina-
tion among uses under market or-
der programs. 
Two cases stress the impor-
tance of the price-discriminating 
ruling. In one case the Federal 
Trade Commission ordered a cit-
rus co-op to refrain from discrim-
inating among its customers on 
prices of canned citrus juice. On 
another occasion, a district court 
prohibited several dairy co-ops 
from joining together to distribute 
milk at lower prices in one area 
than in others to retaliate against 
a dealer who refused to increase 
his buying price. 
Several cases also suggest that 
cooperatives exceed legal limits 
when they act jointly with non-
cooperatives for purposes which 
may not be illegal if sought sep-
arately. For example, a court 
ruled it illegal for a co-op to con-
spire with milk distributors and a 
labor union to fix prices and con-
trol the milk supply in Chicago. 
What About Market Power? 
Can a co-op acquire and exercise 
monopoly power to increase prices 
received by its farmer-members? 
Recent events have forced the 
Supreme Court for the first time 
to interpret the nature of exemp-
tions granted to restrain trade or 
to achieve a monopoly and to 
specify the extent to which they 
immunize co-ops from antitrust 
actions for advancing their own 
interests. 
The first judicial interpretation 
in this area was in 1916 when a 
district court ruled that a potato 
growers association couldn't 
"blacklist" dealers who were de-
linquent in payments or who re-
fused to buy from members of the 
association. The same court rec-
ognized the legality of cooperative 
organization among competitive 
producers. 
In two other cases, involving 
cranberry co-ops, the courts ruled 
that co-ops aren't immune to anti-
trust prosecution for purely pred-
atory practices such as seeking a 
dominant share of the market, or 
for using otherwise legitimate 
methods in bad faith. These 
courts also recognized the right of 
co-ops to acquire a large, even 
100-percent, position in a market 
if done solely through steps in-
volving co-op selling. 
Hence, the methods used to 
achieve and maintain market 
power may expose a co-op to anti-
trust attack even though it's not 
a violation for the organization to 
lawfully acquire even a "com-
plete" monopoly or 100-percent 
control of the market. 
New Decisions ..• 
Recent Supreme Court rulings 
on co-op status were issued in 
1960. The results provide the 
best basis yet for judging how far 
cooperatives may legally go. 
The rulings involved a co-op 
that supplied about 85 percent of 
the fluid milk consumed in the 
Washington, D . C., metropolitan 
area. Attempting to strengthen 
its market position, the co-op 
bought the assets of the market's 
largest distributor, which hadn't 
regularly obtained raw milk from 
the association. 
The transaction gave the co-op 
95-percent control of raw milk 
supplies and 91-percent control of 
the milk supply for resale to the 
government. The acquisition also 
diverted to the co-op the market 
outlet of 120 producers who had 
supplied the distributor. 
Complaints against the action 
in federal district court charged 
violation of the antimerger provi-
sions of the Clayton Act. The 
complaints also listed alleged 
predatory practices in violation of 
the Sherman Act. The court con-
sidered the association exempt 
from monopolization charges un-
der the Capper-Volstead Act, but 
tried the co-op on the acquisition 
charge- and ordered the co-op to 
dispose of the acquired dairy. 
Both the government and the 
co-op appealed to the Supreme 
Court - the government sought 
reinstatement of the monopoliza-
tion charge; the co-op sought re-
versal of its merger conviction in 
the district court. 
The Supreme Court agreed 
with the district court that the 
purchase contract wasn't made 
merely to advance the co-op's own 
processing and marketing busi-
ness. Rather, the court said that 
the co-op had entered the contract 
as a weapon to suppress compe-
tition. The court ruled that even 
lawful contracts and business ac-
tivities may help to form a pat-
tern of conduct that's unlawful 
under the Sherman Act. 
In addition to supporting the 
district court's decision on the ac-
quisition charge, the Supreme 
Court viewed the monopolization 
charges as anticompetitive activ-
ity so far outside the "legitimate 
objectives" of a cooperative that 
-if clearly proved-violated the 
Sherman Act. 
Turning to the question of how 
far exemptions from antitrust 
laws extend for co-ops, the court 
completely discarded the idea that 
Congress intended to grant com-
plete antitrust immunity. It de-
fined the intent of Congress to be 
simply that individual farm oper-
ators should be given, through ag-
ricultural cooperatives, the same 
unified competitive advantage and 
responsibility available to busi-
nessmen acting through corpora-
tions. 
It further declared that the ex-
emption statutes don't allow co-
ops to monopolize or to restrain 
trade and suppress competition. 
Also, the court said that the priv-
ilege that the Capper-Volstead 
Act grants producers to conduct 
their affairs collectively doesn't 
include a privilege to use a mo-
nopoly position as a lever to force 
membership from independent 
producers and/ or suppress com-
petition among independent proc-
essors. 
A consent decree was entered 
as a supplement to the Supreme 
Court decision. The decree pro-
hibits the co-op from distributing 
fluid milk in the Washington, D. 
C., area for 5 years, except to 
sell milk on government contracts. 
The decree also ordered the asso-
ciation to dispose of two other 
dairies which the association had 
acquired. 
The co-op was admonished 
against interfering with dealers' 
supply sources, against forcing 
dealers to buy milk from the asso-
ciation and was enjoined from re-
prisals against dealers who buy 
milk elsewhere or who do business 
with the co-op or its customers. 
The co-op was prohibited from 
using contracts that can't be term-
inated annually at members' op-
tions. It was required to release 
membership contracts, upon re-
quest, of producers who had 
supplied the independent dairy 
before it was acquired by the as-
sociation. 
Summing Up 
It seems that recent court deci-
sions imply that the use of market 
power by co-ops is likely to be 
restricted to a point which largely 
invalidates their exemption for 
monopoly control over supplies 
and marketings. 
Complete control of the pro-
duction and disposal of a product 
is theoretically open to coopera-
tives under present statutes as 
long as it is acquired by "lawful 
means of attracting voluntary 
membership." On the other hand, 
if co-ops with complete or lesser 
control are held accountable for 
all market conduct deemed "un-
reasonable," then their exemption 
for monopoly structure seems 
largely nullified. Indeed, no leg-
islative exemption is necessary for 
market behavior which is "rea-
sonable." While antitrust actions 
don't seem to be directed against 
power arising solely from large-
scale organization, actions by co-
ops against buyers and competing 
producers that "substantially les-
sen competition" are probably il-
legal. 
It appears that producers don't 
have "special" status in their at-
tempts to achieve market power 
through cooperatives. Marketing 
cooperatives, therefore, may be 
forced to confine their activities 
to "usual marketing functions" 
and to participate in supply-con-
trol and price-fixing activities only 
under specific legislative authori-
zation such as federal or state 
market order programs. 
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